BLIND PEOPLE IN MORAY FACE ISOLATION AND INJURY
Posted on Thursday, December 6 2007
Blind people face fear, loneliness and even serious injury for the sake of £27 a week. £27 represents the additional amount paid for the higher rate mobility component of Disability Living Allowance, a benefit paid to help disabled people with their extra costs in getting out and about safely. Blind people are currently denied this benefit despite facing significant challenges in being able to use public transport and travel independently.This was the stark message heard in parliament by Moray MP, Angus Robertson, as the RNIB and five other national sight loss charities marked the anniversary of the biggest ever lobby of parliament by blind and partially sighted people in the UK. In December 2006 over 1,200 people marched on parliament to protest against a benefits system that puts their safety and independence at risk. Angus Robertson said:" Local charities like as Grampian Society for the Blind provide fantastic support but charities cannot provide long-term financial support to everyone who suffers loss of sight. That responsibility lies with the Westminster Government." It seems fundamentally wrong to me that blind people, who can't drive, can only receive the lower rate mobility component of Disability Living Allowance, paid at £17.10 per week. Wheelchair users, who can drive, receive the higher rate of the benefit, £45 per week- over £27 more than a blind person. This situation is putting blind people's safety at risk, as well as denying them social, leisure and educational opportunities that most of us take for granted. I support the organisations pressing government for action on this important campaign"." It is particularly concerning in more rural areas like Moray where the feeling of isolation can be all the greater with access to services being much more reliant on the ability of people to travel."In surveys and parliamentary motions 90 per cent of the general public and 253 MPs have called for a change in benefit rules so blind people get more help with the costs of getting around. At the reception in Parliament, Minister for Disabled People, Anne McGuire MP, was presented with a compilation of audio diaries, recorded by blind people highlighting the exclusion they face because they can't claim the higher benefit rate and so can't afford safe and reliable door to door transport. Amongst those who the Minister heard is Maria Pikulski, 46, who is registered blind. She was a nurse but had to give up work four and a half years ago because of her sight loss. Maria said:" I've experienced real fear and vulnerability. Not able to afford the cost of a taxi, I made one attempt to walk to the local gym at night. It was dark and involved me walking alone in an isolated wooded area where I collided with a tree. I could hear the voices of teenagers who were hanging around but not willing to help. A sighted woman in this situation, fearing the worst could simply look at what was happening and decide what best to do next. Try doing that when you're blind." Maria continued:"I've also missed the opportunity to re-train for a new career at night school because I can't afford the round trip that I need to make in a taxi, costing around £20. Like many blind people, I honestly believe that I'm being stopped from getting on in life. I can't ask my partner to take me to college because he works evenings and nights but why should I have to ask him anyway? My independence is being taken from me all for the sake of around £27 extra per week - please can I have it back?"Charities have been meeting with the Department for Work and Pensions since the campaign began in 2006 and an urgent resolution of the issue is now being sought (3). RNIB Head of Campaigns, Steve Winyard, said:" We welcome Angus Robertson MP's support for the changes we are campaigning for. With such extensive support from MPs and the general public, a listening Government must deliver a positive outcome. The cost could be as little as £30m a year – a very small price to deliver independence for thousands of blind people across the country." Ends.Notes to Editors (1) The Parliamentary Reception organised by RNIB was held in the House of Commons, Terrace Pavilion, from 4.30-6pm on 4 December 2007. Keynote speakers included; the Minister for Disabled People, Ann McGuire MP, Rt Hon David Blunkett MP and Sir John Butterfill MP. It's exactly one year to the day since the biggest lobby of Parliament by blind and partially sighted people took place. 1,200 angry blind and partially sighted people marched on Parliament calling on the Government to end the unfairness that excludes them from the higher rate mobility component of DLA. (2) A survey commissioned by RNIB showed that 90 per cent of the general public agreed that blind people should receive the same level of financial support as wheelchair users. Only 3 per cent disagreed and 7 per cent 'weren't sure'. RNIB used specialist research agency, TNS for this research. Using the consumer Omnibus, Omnimas, TNS polled 2013 adult consumers from 16-20/03/ 2007 and 23-27/03/2007 via face-to-face interviews (3) RNIB, together with the National Federation of Blind People, National League of the Blind and Disabled, Action for Blind People, Guide Dogs for the Blind Association and the National Association of Local Societies for Visually Impaired People (NALSVI), is calling for an amendment to Section 73(3) of the 1992 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act such that people who are under 65 and have serious sight loss are able to claim the higher rate mobility component of DLA.
NIMROD CRASH INQUIRY CONCLUDES: 'AGE WAS A POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR'
Posted on Tuesday, December 4 2007
The Royal Air Force Board of Inquiry (BOI) into the Nimrod crash in Afghanistan last year which claimed the lives of 14 service personnel has concluded that "age was a possible contributory factor". Westminster SNP Leader, Angus Robertson MP, whose Moray constituency is home to the Nimrod fleet at RAF Kinloss, has reacted to the BOI by stressing the bravery of the service personnel who died. Speaking in the House of Commons Mr Robertson said: "The inquiry confirms that the crew did everything they could in the circumstances to save the aircraft. They were brave professional aviators to the last. This is recognised at RAF Kinloss and the entire service and civilian community in Moray. We pay tribute to them today." Twelve RAF personnel and two other servicemen were killed on 2 September 2006 when their Nimrod, call sign XV230, exploded shortly after mid-air refuelling. Mr Robertson went on to highlight matters of concern in the BOI findings: "The inquiry has found that the age of the Nimrod aircraft was a possible contributory factor to the crash in Afghanistan. This is a serious cause for concern as it impacts on the rest of the fleet which is nearly 40 years old. "With a four year gap until the new generation of Nimrods enter service the safety recommendations from the Board of Inquiry must be implemented as a priority. "Only recently another Nimrod aircraft suffered a serious fuel leak, and it has proved impossible to fully understand why this happened. "It is a cause of concern that the inquiry confirmed the loss of experienced engineering personnel from RAF Kinloss. "The Ministry of Defence must do everything in its power to restore confidence in the Nimrod fleet which performs a vital military role. "The families of the victims, the service personnel at RAF Kinloss and the civilian community in Moray expect that safety must come first." ENDS
Nimrod Safety Questions POSED
Posted on Tuesday, December 4 2007
MOD needs to give detailed answers The Ministry of Defence is facing a series of detailed questions a day ahead of the publication of Board of Inquiry (BOI) findings into the Nimrod crash in Afghanistan last year which claimed the lives of 14 service personnel. Westminster SNP Leader, Angus Robertson MP, whose Moray constituency is home to the Nimrod fleet at RAF Kinloss, has today (Monday) written to Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne, to ensure that all questions about Nimrod safety are answered. Twelve RAF personnel and two other servicemen were killed on 2 September 2006 when their Nimrod, call sign XV230, exploded shortly after mid-air refuelling. Speaking about the Board of Inquiry and the unanswered questions Angus Robertson MP said: " Everybody hopes that the inquiry will answer all of the relevant questions about the Nimrod which crashed in Afghanistan and help avoid a repeat of the tragedy. " There are however, a host of unanswered questions about the safety of the ageing Nimrod fleet as a whole which the Ministry of Defence must answer."The MOD has to restore confidence in the wake of the tragedy and a series of safety incidents. " I have sent Secretary of State Des Browne 15 key questions about Nimrod safety which must be answered if confidence is to be restored." Moray's Member of the Scottish Parliament Richard Lochhead said:" The publication of this report is long overdue and I hope that at least some of the questions hanging over this tragedy will be answered by it. I suspect however that there will be more questions than answers." As well as taking so many lives, this terrible incident has caused grief and distress to a great many family and friends of the victims and they have a right to know the answers." ENDSNotes for Editors:The 15 questions to Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne are as follows: 1) A BAe report in 2004 on the Nimrod MR2 fleet recommended the fitting of fire extinguishers in the bomb bay. Why was none ever fitted by the RAF despite this recommendation? Was cost saving the priority? 2) The BAe report also recommended that the RAF keep a watching brief on fuel tank protection directives in the commercial aviation sector. For the crew of XV230, a fuel tank protection system would have provided a second layer of defence from a fire on-board, potentially giving them the time to make an emergency landing. Why was this recommendation also apparently ignored - despite the fact that the RAF had already lost Hercules XV179 to a fuel tank explosion in January 2005? 3) The BAe report also highlighted the supply of hot air to the supplementary conditioning pack (SCP) as a cause for concern when it spoke of the risk of adjacent hot air pipes to fuel tanks as a source of ignition, following an incident in which this happened. Why - when stopping the use of the SCP was a no-cost safety measure - did the RAF do nothing until they lost a crew? Now, apparently, the SCP on the MR2 is no longer used - suggesting the RAF only heeded BAe's recommendation when it was too late. 4) After the more recent emergency landing by a Nimrod MR2 last month, when fuel started spraying into the bomb bay during air to air refuelling, the RAF was unable to replicate the fault on the ground - meaning that it was unable to fix it. Why was the fleet not grounded at this stage? 5) Were such faults to be discovered on a civil airliner, e.g. a lack of fire extinguishers, the fleet would be grounded. Why is it deemed acceptable for military crews to run avoidable risks on top of the major risks they already agree to run by serving on operations in a war zone? Is operational tempo driving this, and should the MoD still be allowed to regulate itself in terms of RAF aircrafts' exemption from current civil aviation standards? 6) The ageing Nimrod MR2, now 37 years old, was due to leave service a decade ago - why is its replacement, the Nimrod MRA4, not coming into service until 2011 at the earliest - was this an example of inadequate procurement? And is it deemed safe to fly the current ageing fleet in demanding and difficult conditions for another four years or is this a decision being driven by the need to save money? 7) Another maintenance report on the MR2 fleet, carried out by QinetiQ in March 2006, six months ahead of the loss of the XV230, highlighted the extent of fuel leaks on board the fleet - a known problem - and in particular on the six aircraft flying intensive schedules over Afghanistan and Iraq. The leaks, the document says, represented a "critical" structural problem - dating back at least ten years, along with problems with the seals and sealants on the pipework. The report said those leaks were made worse by air-to-air refuelling (AAR), something the Nimrod was not originally designed to do. Was this report ever acted on by the RAF and why was it deemed necessary to continue air to air refuelling, even though it was known to exacerbate the problem of fuel leaks? (8) In Feb 2006, seven months before XV230 crashed in Afghanistan, the Government organisation QinetiQ were invited to Kinloss by the Nimrod IPT to carry out a survey of several aircraft and advise on the growing number of fuel leak problems in the Nimrod fleet. One of the aircraft involved in the survey was Nimrod XV230. In March 2006, QinetiQ produced a very detailed visit report which contained several recommendations. Can MoD advise as to which of these recommendations have been implemented, some 20 months after the report was issued? In particular the use of outdated servicing documents and tools, and the lack of shared data between civilian contractors at Kinloss with the IPT, MoD and BAE. (9) Prior to going to the Gulf on 3rd August 2006, Nimrod XV230 underwent a new form of servicing, drawn up by the Nimrod IPT, known as equalised maintenance. The maintenance period lasted some eight weeks and was carried out by a civilian contractor at Kinloss. Prior to entering this planned maintenance programme the aircraft had just returned back from the Gulf and had nine reported fuel defects. After eight weeks on the ground the aircraft left the civilian contractor with seven of those defects unrectified. Can MoD advise why this was allowed to happen, considering that this was the first aircraft to undergo the new programme and should have been closely monitored by the IPT? Can MoD also confirm that the contract does call for a fully serviceable aircraft on completion of maintenance, or has this been missed from the contract? (10) In August 2004, BAE Systems issued a Safety Case report covering fire/explosion hazards on Nimrod MR Mk2 and R Mk1 aircraft. The report recommended that the bomb bay fire suppression system fitted for extended range tankage role be utilised in normal operation. Failure to do so could result in an uncontrollable bomb bay fire to the point of leading to loss of an aircraft. This recommendation was rejected by MoD on the grounds that is was thought that such a system would be ineffective. Can MoD state whether this conclusion was arrived at following system trials, or was it simply arrived at through some form of paper exercise? (11) The same report recommended that in the light of the TWA 800 in-flight fuel tank explosion, that fuel tank nitrogen inerting systems should be seriously considered for all new and in-service aircraft, to prevent the occurrence of an explosive vapour in a partially empty tank. Can MoD advise what steps have been taken that to accommodate this recommendation? (12) It is understood that the Nimrod R Mk1 is to receive a new mission fit under "project Phoenix", this should extend its operational life to 2025. In view of the comments made in the QinetiQ report regarding possible corrosion in wing fuel tanks and the age of the aircraft, how does the MoD expect the Nimrod R airframe to last to 2025? The R and the MR are two different aircraft types, but the basic airframe/ fuel systems are the same. (13) In a 2005 report into an incident involving a corroded super hot air pipe in the Supplementary Cooling Pack (SPC) of XV227 it was recommended that a survey was to be undertaken to determine what similar pipes (ducts) were in the same condition. It appears that it has taken two years to undertake such a survey on just two aircraft, and as yet no revised inspection programme has been initiated. At the time of XV230's accident the SPC was still being used, but was isolated on all Nimrod aircraft immediately afterwards. Can MoD advise as to who was responsible for making the decision to continue using the SPC after the XV227 accident, as clearly, from the actions taken later it was a high risk component? (14) On the 5th Nov, this year, there was an fuel leak incident over Afghanistan involving XV235. Like many of the in-flight fuel leaks the incident happened after AAR, and AAR was suspended. In the past AAR has resumed after ground test and AAR procedures have been revised, clearly without getting to the real problem. Can MoD new procedures are now being considered by the IPT to get AAR operational, and how sure are they that they have got it right this time? (15) AAR was introduced to the Nimrod during the Falklands dispute in order to get the aircraft from one theatre of operation to another, not to be used on a regular basis as it is being used today. Can MoD advise as to what changes were made to the Nimrod safety case for (a) using AAR for the Falklands, and (b) for today's regular use, overland?
|